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WHY DO SOME MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS RELOCATE THEIR 
HEADQUARTERS OVERSEAS? 
 
 
This paper examines the decision by a multinational corporation (MNC) to relocate business 
unit or corporate HQ overseas. We argue that business unit HQs move overseas in response 
to changes in the internal configuration of their unit’s activities, whereas corporate HQs 
move overseas is response to the demands of external stakeholders, such as overseas 
shareholders, capital markets, and global customers.  Using data on 125 business unit HQs 
and 35 corporate HQs, we test and find broad support for these arguments.  The research 
highlights important differences between corporate- and business-level strategy, and it 
suggests ways in which the theory of the MNC needs to be reconsidered. 
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WHY DO SOME MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS RELOCATE THEIR 
HEADQUARTERS OVERSEAS? 
 
 
A fundamental issue in strategic management is the distinction between business-level and 
corporate-level strategy.  Business unit strategy is concerned with the competitive positioning 
of a business within its chosen industry domain; Corporate strategy defines the scope of 
businesses in which the firm participates, and the ways in which value is added across those 
businesses to create a whole that is greater than the sum of the parts (Bourgeois, 1980; 
Chandler, 1991; Hofer and Schendel, 1978). The distinction between the two forms of 
strategy was first articulated clearly in the academic literature in the 1970s (Hofer, 1975; 
Vancil and Lorange, 1975), and large bodies of literature subsequently emerged at both the 
business unit (Hatten et al, 1978; Murray, 1988; Porter, 1980) and corporate (Collis and 
Montgomery, 1997; Goold, Campbell and Alexander, 1994) levels of analysis. 
 
At a managerial level, the separation of responsibilities between business unit and corporate 
executives allowed large firms to emerge (Chandler, 1962; 1977; Williamson, 1975), and 
helped to professionalize the processes of strategic planning (Henderson, 1968; Lorange, 
1975).  At an academic level, it crystallised the importance of the industry as the competitive 
battleground for a business unit, resulting in major advances in the theory of competitive 
advantage (Porter, 1980; 1985). This, in turn, led to a more sophisticated articulation of the 
nature of corporate strategy, and the specific roles that corporate executives could play in 
facilitating competitive advantage within the business units, and in defining the scope of the 
firm (Goold, Campbell and Alexander, 1994).  Indeed, it is almost axiomatic within the field 
today that firms benefit from clearly distinguishing between business unit and corporate 
strategy.  
 
Most strategy research focuses on questions of “what” and “how”.  What refers to strategy 
content issues, which at the business unit level include such things as generic strategies, 
market positioning, and strategic moves, and at the corporate level includes portfolio 
analysis, resource analysis, and types of synergies.  How refers to strategy process issues, 
which at the business unit level focus on the formal and informal mechanisms by which 
individual actions are aligned around collective goals, and at the corporate level include 
resource allocation mechanisms (Bower, 1970) and styles of parenting (Goold and Campbell, 
1982).   
 
In this paper, we argue that it is also important to answer the where question – to understand 
where strategy development takes place, and the extent to which this differs between the 
corporate and business unit levels of analysis.  More specifically, we focus on business unit 
headquarters and corporate headquarters, the entities ultimately responsible for business unit 
and corporate strategy (Rumelt, Schendel and Teece, 1994), and we attempt to make sense of 
the choices firms make regarding their geographical location.  Clearly for a small firm this is 
a rather trivial question, because all activities tend to be co-located, and the location is 
essentially a historical accident. But for a multinational corporation (MNC) with multiple 
business units, multiple countries of operation, and a geographically diverse set of 
stakeholders, the question of where to locate headquarters operations is of considerable 
importance, for three reasons.   
 
First, location will ultimately affect firm competitiveness. There are well-established theories 
of agglomeration in the literature, and it is now accepted that proximity to specialised labour, 
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complementary suppliers and customers, and access to knowledge spillovers are all important 
benefits to the firm (Marshall, 1890; Porter, 1990).  At the business unit level, Porter (1980) 
initially developed his theory of competitive advantage without regard to location, but in his 
subsequent work (Porter, 1990) the importance of geographical clustering to firm-level 
competitiveness became evident. And a number of related studies have also picked up on the 
link between location and firm performance (Malmberg, Solvell and Zander, 1996; Saxenian, 
1994).   At the corporate level, the issue of headquarters location has been given little 
attention, but many of the ideas around spatial clustering, in terms of access to specialised 
labour and proximity to key stakeholders, are potentially relevant, and there is research on the 
impact of location on access to capital for large corporations (Coffee, 2002; Saudagaran, 
1988). 
  
Second, a better understanding of headquarters location, and the extent to which location 
choices vary between business unit and corporate levels, should help us to sharpen our 
theories.  As the paper will show, the drivers of business unit HQ relocation and corporate 
HQ relocation are dramatically different, and these differences shed important light on the 
actual roles HQ executives play in large multinational corporations; which in turn offers 
implications for the distinction between business unit and corporate strategy. There are also 
implications for the theory of the MNC, which is concerned with understanding the nature 
and existence of firms that operate in multiple countries. This body of theory traditionally 
assumed that “firm specific” advantages were developed in the home country and 
subsequently leveraged in host-country markets (Vernon, 1966; Dunning, 1981). 
Increasingly, it has been recognised that such advantages can emerge in multiple locations 
and through both parent-driven and subsidiary-driven processes (Birkinshaw and Hood, 
1998; Rugman and Verbeke, 1992; 2001), though again with a presumption that the home 
country is stable.  If MNCs are now shifting their headquarters operations overseas, the 
traditional distinction between the home and host country is less relevant, and theory will 
have to be adapted accordingly.  
 
Finally, the phenomenon of HQ relocation is on the rise. MNCs have been relocating their 
business units overseas for many years (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Hedlund, 1986), and for 
MNCs from small open economies such as Sweden, Netherlands and Canada it is common to 
see 20%-30% of all business units located outside the home country (Forsgren et al, 1995).   
The relocation of corporate HQ overseas, in contrast is still relatively rare. Early examples 
were Massey Ferguson, which moved its HQ from Canada to the US and renamed itself 
Varity, and Tetra Pak which moved its HQ from Sweden to Lausanne, Switzerland. More 
recent cases include four major South African MNCs (Anglo American, Investec Bank, Old 
Mutual, SABMiller) who relocated some or all of their HQ activities to London; and Nokia’s 
decision to move its corporate finance activities to New York.  Analysis of the Fortune 500 
list of global companies suggests that around 23 of these companies have shifted their entire 
HQ overseas1. This is a small number, but it is worth noting that many others have relocated 
part of their corporate HQ activities overseas (e.g. Nokia); and most of these changes have 
occurred in the last 5 years, so the phenomenon is becoming more common. 
 
The purpose of this paper, then, is to develop and test a set of arguments explaining the 
relocation of business unit and corporate HQs overseas, and in particular to show how the 
drivers of HQ relocation are different at the business unit and corporate levels.  The paper is 
in three main sections. First, we describe the role and activities of headquarters in the MNC, 
and develop hypotheses to explain the relocation of HQ overseas.  Second, we set out our 
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data collection and methods.  Third, we describe the findings from the study, and discussion 
their implications for management theory and practice.    
 
 
BACKGROUND ON ROLE AND ACTIVITIES OF HEADQUARTERS 
 
One of the key stages in the development of the modern corporation was the emergence of 
the “M-Form” organisation, in which the management of individual businesses was 
decentralized to free up top executives to concentrate on strategic issues.  This management 
innovation can be traced back to the 1920s (Sloan, 1963), though the academic literature 
documenting and making sense of its benefits did not follow until later (Chandler, 1962; 
Drucker, 1954; Williamson, 1975; Fligstein, 1985). The M-form structure allowed far greater 
operational and geographic diversity than had been possible under a unitary structure, and it 
also enabled specialised roles to emerge for the executives responsible for the business unit 
and corporate HQ respectively. In the 1970s, the formal distinction between corporate and 
business level strategy was articulated (Hofer, 1975; Vancil and Lorange, 1975), and this 
further clarified the roles and responsibilities of executives at the two levels. 
 
Today, the respective roles of business unit and corporate HQ are clearly established. 
Business unit HQ is responsible for the formulation and implementation of its competitive 
strategy – the positioning of the business within its industry, and the means by which it 
strives to achieve above-average returns within that industry (Porter, 1980; 1985).  Corporate 
HQ has two distinct roles. One is an “administrative” role, concerned primarily with 
monitoring and controlling the activities of the business units (Williamson, 1975).  In 
Chandler’s words (1991: 33) this role involves “monitoring the performance of the operating 
divisions: to check on the use of the resources allocated; and, when necessary, redefine the 
product lines of the divisions so as to continue to use effectively the firm’s organizational 
capabilities.”   The other is an “entrepreneurial” role and it is more concerned with the 
creation of additional sources of value. Again quoting Chandler (1991), its purpose is “to 
determine strategies to maintain and then to utilize for the long-term the firm’s organizational 
skills, facilities, and capital and to allocate resources—capital and product-specific technical 
and managerial skills- to pursue these strategies”. While the administrative role is mostly 
internally-focused and concerned with “avoiding the negative”, the entrepreneurial role is 
more concerned with “creating the positive” (Foss, 1997).  However by its nature it is also a 
more discretionary role, and the extent to which it is pursued varies enormously from 
company to company (Goold et al., 2001). 
 
In terms of the actual activities and roles undertaken by HQ, a few recent empirical studies 
have focused on the corporate HQ.  Goold et al. (2001), for example, identify three roles. 
The “minimum corporate parent role” which is somewhat akin to Chandler’s (1991) 
administrative role, performs the basic controlling and regulatory work and typically requires 
only 50 or so people for a 50,000-person company.  The “value-added parenting role” is 
consistent with Chandler’ entrepreneurial role, and varies enormously in size from tens to 
thousands of people. Finally, the “shared services role” consists of common activities such as 
IT, finance, and human resources that the HQ undertakes on behalf of the business units.  
However, it is arguable whether these shared services are part of the corporate HQ per se., 
and indeed in many cases they are either outsourced or managed as separate profit centres.  
Other findings from this research confirm that when it comes to the value-adding role of the 
corporate HQ there is no one best way of operating. There are different strategic styles, and 
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there are often large differences between countries and industries (Young et al., 2002; Goold 
et al., 1994; Goold et al., 2001; Markides, 2001).  
 
With regard to business unit HQ, there is a wide-ranging literature concerned with such 
activities as decision-making, strategic planning, and strategic thinking (Lorange, Nutt, 
Porter, etc**) but little that is concerned with the actual make-up of the HQ function.  In our 
experience, the business unit HQ is typically much smaller than the corporate HQ, in that it 
consists of a management team who collectively represent the different operations and 
activities performed by the business unit, and a number of support activities, such as HR, 
finance and strategic planning. However, the size and scope of these support functions varies 
enormously from case to case.  
 
Finally, in terms of the location of HQ, there is also limited prior research.  At the business 
unit level, Forsgren et al (1995) examined the decision to relocate HQ overseas from a power 
relations point of view, and a number of researchers have given the issue peripheral attention 
(Hedlund, 1986; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989).  And at the corporate level, there is some work 
in finance and law concerned with the decision to list a company on a foreign stock exchange 
and/or change the company’s legal domicile (Coffee, 2002; Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; 
Ghosh, Rodriguez  and Sirmans, 1995; Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Saudagaran, 1988; 
Saudagaran and Biddle, 1995). These studies do not, however, concern themselves with the 
broader roles of the corporate HQ.   
 
Definition of HQ in a Multinational Corporation 
   
Building on both the prior literature and on the insights from our clinical research, we define 
the HQ as having two essential elements – a top management group that typically has an 
official location at which it meets, and a series of HQ functions that have the formal 
responsibility for fulfilling the roles discussed above (treasury, investor relations, corporate 
communications etc), each one of which has an identifiable physical location.  There is also a 
third element in the case of the corporate HQ (but not the business unit HQ), namely the 
legal domicile – the registration of the MNC in a particular sovereign nation, under which all 
the other legal entities that make up the MNC can be grouped. 
 
Traditionally, these elements were collocated, but increasingly we see some separation.  At 
the corporate level, for example, it is common for the firm to create a shell holding company 
in an offshore location for tax reasons, or to move one or more corporate functions away 
from the traditional centre to save money.   It is therefore possible to conceptualize the HQ’s 
location on some sort of continuum, from entirely based in the home country through to 
entirely relocated overseas.  This measure of the degree of HQ relocation overseas becomes 
the dependent variable in our analysis. 
  
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
 
We are now in a position to develop a set of arguments as to why some MNCs move business 
unit and corporate HQs overseas (see figure 1). For business unit HQs, we build primarily on 
the established body of theory in international business concerned with the nature and scope 
of the MNC. For corporate HQs, we draw in addition from institutional theory and from the 
corporate strategy literature.  
 
------------------------------- 
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Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------ 
 
Predictors of Business Unit HQ Relocation  
 
The question “why do business unit HQs move overseas?” can be addressed most effectively 
through the theory of the MNC (Buckley and Casson, Dunning, 1988; Rugman, 1981).  In 
simple terms, the locational choices the MNC makes for each individual activity are a 
function of the combined need to generate firm-specific advantages (through the ways in 
which activities are configured and coordinated on a global basis), and also to leverage the 
country-specific advantages of the locations in which it operates (Rugman and Verbeke, 
1992; 2001).  This formulation gives rise to two distinct lines of argument, as follows.  
 
The first is the notion that the business unit HQ follows other activities overseas.  A well-
established strand of the theory of the MNC is concerned with the logic of sequential 
overseas investments in increasingly important value-adding activities (Forsgren, Holm and 
Johanson, 1992; Kogut, 1982). Initial overseas investment decisions typically begin with 
exporting, then proceed through licensing, alliances and joint ventures to direct investment in 
a sales subsidiary (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977; Root, 1987).  Following the decision to create 
a sales subsidiary, the MNC will often make subsequent overseas investments in 
manufacturing (Vernon, 1966) and R&D (Ronstadt, 1977), and the subsidiary company will 
develop important resources and capabilities of its own (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; 
Malnight, 1994). Finally, the decision may be made to relocate the business unit HQ 
overseas, as the culmination of a process of sequential overseas investment. In other words, 
the business unit HQ moves overseas in pursuit of the sales and manufacturing activities that 
have already moved.   
 
There are three reasons why this might make sense.  First, there are likely to be efficiency 
gains in communication by moving the management team closer to the centre of gravity of 
the business. This will enable more effective interaction between the different activities and 
thereby enhance the development of firm-specific advantages. Second, there may be strategic 
benefits in the form of knowledge spillovers and access to resources in shifting to a new 
location, particularly if that location is a leading-edge cluster for that industry (Porter, 1990). 
And third, there may be symbolic value in relocating the business unit HQ, as a means of 
demonstrating to employees of the business unit, as well as outside stakeholders, that the 
business is global in its outlook.  All of which provides motivation for the first hypothesis:   
 
Hypothesis 1.The greater the percentage of business activities (sales units, manufacturing 
units) overseas, the greater the likelihood of business unit headquarters moving overseas. 
 
The second argument is concerned with the relative attractiveness of the traditional location 
vis-à-vis the potential new location for the business unit HQ.  Conceptually, any activity 
within the MNC is potentially mobile, and while there are obvious and important reasons 
why many activities do not move, MNCs are increasingly looking at this issue (e.g. offshore 
call centres, logistics hubs, regional HQs) and national inward investment agencies are 
actively seeking out such mobile investments. There is, in other words, a functioning market 
for inward investment, and it involves explicit analysis on the part of the MNC of the relative 
attractiveness of different possible locations for any given activity. 
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In the context of the business unit HQ, the potential attractiveness of a location is multi-
faceted. One set of factors is related to the agglomeration of related and supporting business 
activities (Porter, 1990); there are also issues of economic stability, a supportive political 
environment, and quality of life for the employees. For example, it is widely reported in the 
Swedish context that companies are moving HQs out because of high personal taxes. While 
this is undoubtedly important, it is just one element in a complex bundle of factors that have 
to be considered in aggregate.  Taken as a whole, then, we argue that the overall 
attractiveness of the potential host country location (in relation to the home country) will be a 
significant predictor of the movement of business unit HQ overseas. 
 
Hypothesis 2. The more attractive the potential host country location is perceived to be (in 
comparison to the home country location), the greater the likelihood of business unit 
headquarters moving overseas. 
 
It is worth noting that in both cases (H1 and H2) we expect these predictor variables to have 
no impact on the location of the corporate HQ.  In other words, we expect the movement of 
business activities and a more attractive host country to drive the business unit HQ relocation 
decision, but not the corporate HQ relocation decision. These expectations are formally tested 
in the statistical analysis. 
  
Predictors of Corporate HQ Relocation 
 
Because the role of the corporate HQ is substantially different from the role of the business 
unit HQ, our general expectation is that the drivers of HQ relocation will be very different.  
While we subscribe to the distinction noted earlier between the administrative and 
entrepreneurial roles of the corporate HQ (Chandler, 1991), we would argue that there is a 
second important distinction between its internally-focused and externally-focused activities. 
The corporate HQ has an internal agenda, in terms of monitoring, evaluating, and developing 
the business units, and it has an external agenda, in terms of managing its interfaces with 
external stakeholders such as the capital markets and major customers.  Viewed in this way, 
the corporate HQ is essentially a “middleman” or broker between the business units on the 
one hand, and the external stakeholders on the other (Goold, Campbell and Alexander, 1994) 
and, just as with any other middleman role, it has to demonstrate to both sets of parties that it 
adds sufficient value that it does not become disintermediated. 
 
What is the appropriate set of external stakeholders? It is widely recognised that corporate 
HQ has a potentially important value-adding role to play in managing relationships with the 
capital markets and shareholders . In terms of global customers and competitors, the role of 
corporate HQ is more debateable, because these could be viewed as the exclusive concern of 
business units. However our preference is to include them, because in many cases 
(particularly in less diversified firms) the corporate HQ has an active role to play in relating 
to such global customers and competitors. For example, at the time of the research, Ericsson 
had separate business units for mobile infrastructure and mobile handsets (now in a joint 
venture with Sony), and each had its own competitive strategy. But there was still a valuable 
role for Ericsson corporate to play in integrating across these business units and building 
relationships with top executives in customers such as Cable & Wireless and Vodafone. 
There was also a public relations role for Ericsson’s corporate executives to play in 
positioning the company vis-à-vis global competitors such as Nokia, Lucent and Nortel 
(though arguably they did not play this role very well)2. 
 
9 
In terms of location, the corporate HQ was traditionally co-located with its business units on 
the basis of historical convenience.  However, as we have noted, the process of globalisation 
led to a number of changes. First business units themselves became more international in 
their scope, which led various activities, including business unit HQs, to move overseas.  
Second, external stakeholders also changed, with financial markets, competitors, and 
customers all becoming more global in their scope. Third, international communication 
became easier, through advances in phone and fax technology, teleconferencing, the Internet, 
and airline travel. A fourth factor, which has less to do with globalisation, was the general 
reduction in size of corporate HQs, with many services being spun off, moved into business 
units, or simply scrapped (Young et al., 2000).  
 
The net result of all these changes is that, as with business units, corporate HQs are becoming 
increasingly mobile. It is no longer essential for corporate HQ to be co-located with its 
business units. Instead, the location of corporate HQ is potentially mobile and it is determined 
by the relative importance of its relationships with internal and external stakeholders. Our 
broad proposition, then, is that that when relationships with external stakeholders are 
particularly salient and when those external stakeholders are located outside the home 
country, there is an incentive for the corporate HQ to relocate overseas.   This proposition is 
now broken down into two specific hypotheses  - one concerning international financial 
markets, the other concerning customers and competitors. 
 
International financial markets. There has been a process of consolidation underway in the 
financial sector for the last two decades, such that the major investment banks are large and 
global, institutional investors are increasingly international in outlook, and stock exchanges 
themselves are beginning to ally and merge with each other (Coffee, 2002).   To the extent 
that the MNC is affected by such changes – for example because its shares are increasingly 
held by foreign institutions -  we would expect to see its corporate HQ becoming increasingly 
international in its outlook, and ultimately to consider moving all or part of its HQ functions 
to a major financial centre like London or New York.  As with business unit headquarters, 
there are three interrelated sets of reasons for such a shift to occur.  First, there may be 
efficiency gains in terms of the time spent travelling to meetings with shareholders, analysts 
and investment banks.  Second, there are likely to be strategic benefits in terms of the 
proximity to specialised service providers (consultants, lawyers, accountants), and the 
availability of high-quality executive talent.  Indeed, many of the benefits of clustering that 
are relevant at the business unit level also apply to global financial centres, so just as business 
unit HQs will sometimes relocate to a leading industrial cluster, so might corporate HQs 
relocate to a service-dominated cluster such as the city of London (Enright, 2000). 
 
Third, there is strong symbolic value in relocating corporate HQ, as a means of signalling to 
international banks and investors that the MNC is no longer constrained by local norms and 
expectations, and is thus a player in the global financial markets (Zaheer, 1995).  Institutional 
theory provides a rationale for such a shift: it suggests that organisations will often adopt the 
practices of other players within their “institutional field” as a means of establishing their 
legitimacy (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977).  Interestingly, such 
behaviour is not necessarily efficient in terms of its direct effect on performance, but the 
social legitimacy it provides can prove beneficial to long-term survival. Thus, even if the 
arguments developed above about efficiency and strategic benefits do not hold, it would still 
be possible to see the relocation of corporate HQs overseas if executives perceived the need 
to position their firm as a global, rather than domestic, player.  Thus:   
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Hypothesis 3. The greater the international influence from shareholders (in terms of the 
location of the primary stock listing and the percentage of foreign shareholders), the greater 
the likelihood of corporate headquarters moving overseas. 
 
International customers and competitors.  Both customers and competitors are becoming 
more international in their outlook.  MNC customers have often had global operations for 
many decades, but the relatively recent change is that these customers are now seeking 
globally-coordinated sourcing from their suppliers (Kotabe, 1992; Kotabe and Omura, 1989), 
and vendor MNCs are responding with so-called “global account management” programs to 
integrate their sales and service offerings on a worldwide basis (Birkinshaw et al., 2001; 
Montgomery and Yip, 2002).  Competitors are also becoming more concentrated, and in 
many industries one sees the emergence of a tier of global players that dominate (e.g. IBM, 
EDS and Accenture in IT services), and then a number of regional and local players in their 
shadow.   
 
To the extent that the MNC is selling to globally-integrated customers, and competing in a 
market dominated by global competitors, we would expect to see the relocation of corporate 
HQ as a potentially worthwhile move. Again, there are potentially three sets of reasons why 
such a move might make sense.  In terms of efficiency the gains are likely to be small, 
because even in a case like Ericsson, the majority of the interactions with customers are 
carried out by marketing and sales people, not corporate executives.  In terms of strategic 
benefits, the increased proximity of HQ executives to key customers should foster stronger 
relationships, which should in turn have long-term value to the MNC. By way of example, 
Ericsson’s HQ relocation to London and Boeing’s relocation to Chicago were both predicated 
in part on superior access to major global customers. Finally, in terms of symbolic benefits, 
there is again an institutional theory logic, namely that by relocating the corporate HQ out of 
the traditional home country, the MNC is its positioning itself as a global player within its 
industry.  In such a case, the city to which HQ moves is less important than the act of 
moving.  Taken together, these arguments suggest the following: 
 
Hypothesis 4. The greater the international influence from customers and competitors, the 
greater the likelihood of corporate headquarters moving overseas. 
 
Relationship between corporate and business unit HQ 
 
The final hypothesis is concerned with the relationship between corporate HQ and business 
unit HQ.   As noted earlier, there are different approaches to corporate strategy depending on 
such factors as the level of relatedness of the business units, and the preferred level of 
planning and control influence from the centre (Goold and Campbell, 1982).  At one extreme, 
the corporate HQ for an unrelated diversified firm is typically very small and adds little 
value; at the other extreme, the corporate HQ for a strongly-related set of businesses is much 
larger, and more intimately involved in the strategy and operations of its businesses (Collis 
and Montgomery, 1997). 
 
In terms of the issues developed in this paper, we would expect the level of interdependence 
between the corporate and business unit levels to have a direct and negative impact on the 
likelihood of HQ activities moving overseas; in other words it will typically encourage both 
HQs to stay where they are. The argument can be expressed best in terms of Thompson’s 
(1967) distinction between pooled, sequential and reciprocal interdependence. Advances in 
communication technology make it relatively easy for overseas business units to report their 
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monthly figures (pooled interdependence) and to coordinate their part of a global supply 
chain with other distant units (sequential interdependence). However, the process of aligning 
the strategy of one business unit with the demands and constraints of other parts of the firm 
can be characterised as reciprocal interdependence, in that it requires ongoing mutual 
adjustment between parties. Such adjustment is best done on a face-to-face basis and 
preferably through co-location of activities.  Thus:  
 
Hypothesis 5. The greater the level of interdependence between business unit and corporate 
headquarters, the lower the likelihood of corporate or business unit headquarters moving 
overseas. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
Sample  
 
The research was conducted in the forty largest Swedish Multinational Corporations.  
Sweden represented an appropriate setting because as a small, open economy, its firms were 
very early to internationalise, and they were among the first to shift major value-adding 
activities overseas (Hedlund, 1986; Johanson and Vahlne, 1977).  During the 1990s many 
Swedish firms relocated business unit headquarters overseas (Forsgren, Holm and Johanson, 
1995), and a smaller –but significant- number began to move corporate headquarters 
overseas.   
 
We identified the largest 40 Swedish MNCs by sales volume3.  "Swedish" in this context 
meant companies that grew from a Swedish base, and that were still recognisably Swedish in 
culture. For example Tetra Pak was classified as Swedish, despite being legally domiciled in 
Switzerland, because it was still run and owned by the Swedish Rausing brothers. Akzo 
Nobel, on the other hand, was excluded because Nobel (a Swedish company) was bought by 
the much larger Dutch company, Akzo and subsequently integrated into its Dutch parent.   
 
Of the forty companies we approached, 35 agreed to participate with the research.  A senior 
executive in each company filled in a detailed corporate-level questionnaire asking questions 
about the location of various activities, the attractiveness of Sweden as a location, and the 
reasons for moving corporate HQ overseas (or not).  This individual also provided us with 
names and contact details of all the business units reporting to the corporate HQ – between 
two and ten business units in each case. This gave us a sampling frame of 206 business units, 
and we then sent the business unit-level questionnaire to the managing director of each. We 
received 125 responses (a response rate of 61%), of which 85 were located in Sweden and 40 
were located overseas. Analysis of the non-respondents indicated that the percentage of 
respondents from overseas (31%) was almost identical to the percentage of business units 
located overseas in the entire sample (63 out of 206). Finally, we used a variety of secondary 
data sources including financial reports, Hoovers, and analysts reports, to collect information 
about shareholders, customers and competitors.  Finally, we also conducted a round of in-
person interviews with seven of these companies to ensure that we had a complete picture of 
the phenomenon under investigation. 
 
Measurement of HQ location (dependent variable) 
 
As observed earlier, there is no definitive way to measure HQ location.  We considered three 
relevant indicators: the legal domicile, the location of the top management team, and the 
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location of the various HQ functions.   While the legal domicile of the corporation is clearly 
an important issue, the country in questions is frequently chosen for highly case-specific 
reasons, such as tax reduction, or to guard against foreign interference. Moreover, for the 
business unit, legal domicile is typically a meaningless concept, in that the legal entities are 
defined on a country basis, and they may or may not align with the business unit boundaries 
within the firm. Accordingly, in this study we decided to focus on two measures of HQ 
location that were more concerned with the management of the firm than its tax/legal status.  
These were: (a) the location of the top management team, and (b) the location of the various 
HQ functions.  Specifically, we used the following measures: 
 
Corporate HQ.  Respondents were asked whether the top management team were located in 
Sweden or overseas. Of the 35 responding firms, 29 were located in Sweden (scored 0) and 6 
were located overseas (scored 1).  They were then asked to indicate the number of the 
following HQ functions that were located outside Sweden: investor relations, corporate 
communications, treasury and group financial management, group tax and legal, group 
strategic planning, group HR management, group purchasing and logistics, and group R&D. 
From this, we calculated the percentage of corporate HQ functions located overseas4. 
 
Business Unit HQ. The location of each business unit’s top management team was identified 
by the corporate respondent (to avoid common-method bias).  Again, this resulted in a 
dichotomous variable, with 85 business units located in Sweden (scored 0) and 40 located 
overseas (scored 1).  The business unit respondent then indicated the number of business unit 
HQ functions located outside Sweden, using the same list as above, and we again calculated 
the percentage of HQ functions located overseas.  We thus ended up with one dichotomous 
and one continuous variable for each level of HQ. 
 
Measurement of independent variables 
 
(1) Percent business unit activities overseas.  Business unit-level respondents were asked to 
indicate (a) the percentage of sales units outside Sweden and (b) the percentage of 
manufacturing units outside Sweden. These two numbers were highly correlated (r = .51, 
p<.001) so they were combined to form a single scale. 
 
(2) Perceived attractiveness of business unit HQ location. Business unit-level respondents 
were asked to rate the characteristics of the local business environment, in terms of nine 
specific factors: (a) level of rivalry among business competitors within your industry, (b) 
demands from competent customers, (c) demands from competent suppliers, (d) access to 
competent suppliers, (e) existence of closely-linked firms, directly or indirectly relating to 
your business, (f) quality of governmental politics, (g) Quality of relationships between 
politicians and commercial sector, (h) Proximity to investment and banking industries, and (i) 
quality of laws that regulate business (1=very low, 7= very high).  We developed these items 
from an earlier questionnaire (Birkinshaw, Hood and Jonsson, 1998) to cover the elements of 
Porter’s (1990) diamond model as well as broader attributes of the political and economic 
environment. These nine items loaded onto a single factor, Alpha = 0.75. 
 
(3) Influence of international shareholders.  Using secondary sources of data (annual reports, 
Hoovers, analysts reports), we measured (a) location of the primary exchange on which 
shares are traded, 0=Stockholm, 1=other; and (b) the percentage of capital stock owned by 
non-Swedes. 
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(4) Influence of international customers and competitors. Using secondary sources of data 
(annual reports, Hoovers), we measured (a) the percentage of corporate sales outside Sweden, 
and (b) the percentage of corporate competitors located outside Sweden5. These two numbers 
were highly correlated (r=.55, p<.01) so we combined them to form a single scale. 
 
(5) Interdependence between business unit and corporate HQs. We used different 
measurement approaches for this construct at the two different levels of the analysis. At the 
corporate level, we used the entropy index developed by Jacquemin & Berry (1979) which 
considers the breadth of three-digit SIC codes in which the MNC competes.  While there are 
many different approaches to measuring diversification, this is probably the most common 
within the field of strategic management (Palepu, 1985).  This measure is as follows 
∑Σi Pi ln(1/Pi) 
where Pi is the amount of sales attributed to each 3-digit SIC segment i and ln(1/Pi) is the 
weight given to each segment, or the natural logarithm of the inverse of its sales.  Thus, this 
measure includes both the number of 3-digit SIC code businesses in which a firm operates 
and the proportion of total sales of each of these SIC code segments. 
 
At the business unit level we measured interdependence in terms of employee flows. 
Business unit respondents were asked to indicate the number of individuals that had moved 
from corporate HQ to business unit HQ, and vice versa, over a three year period, for the 
following categories: (a) top team managers, (b) technical experts, (c) business managers, (d) 
skilled labour.  We calculated an average of all these numbers (alpha = 0.81) to create an 
employee flow index. 
 
Control Variables 
 
In order to test the main argument of the paper - that corporate-level and business unit-level 
HQ relocations are driven by different factors - it is necessary to show for hypotheses 1 and 2 
that the predictor variable influences the relocation of business unit HQ and not corporate 
unit HQ (and vice versa for hypotheses 3 and 4). 
 
For hypothesis 1, we measured the percent corporate activities overseas. Corporate-level 
respondents were asked to indicate (a) the percentage of sales units outside Sweden and (b) 
the percentage of manufacturing units outside Sweden for the entire corporation. These two 
numbers were highly correlated and summed to form a single scale. For hypothesis 2, we 
measured the perceived attractiveness of corporate HQ location. Corporate-level respondents 
were asked to rate the characteristics of the Swedish business environment, in terms of the 
nine specific factors detailed above.  This is equivalent to perceived attractiveness of business 
unit HQ location6.  We also controlled for corporate sales volume in 1999 (measured in 
million SEK). 
 
For hypotheses 3 and 4, we used the relevant corporate level data in the business unit 
analysis.  For example, we took the percentage of foreign shareholders in Sandvik, and 
assigned this number to each one of the four Sandvik business units in the sample.  A total of 
five such variables were used: corporate percent foreign shareholders, corporate percent 
customers/competitors outside Sweden, corporate percent sales and manufacturing units 
overseas, corporate entropy measure of diversification, and corporate sales volume.  In 
addition, we also measured the business unit sales volume as a percentage of the corporate 
total, as a way of factoring in the relative size of the business unit in question. 
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We explored two other control variables. First, we considered the possible effect of corporate 
HQ moving overseas on business unit HQ moving overseas (and vice versa).  Because we 
had the dates of all HQ relocations, it was possible to add dummy variables into the analysis 
at corporate- and business unit- levels.  However, none of these were at all significant, so we 
dropped them from the analysis. Second, we attempted to develop a measure of whether the 
MNC had been involved in an international acquisition or merger recently, on the basis that 
some cases of corporate HQ internationalisation are triggered by such an event.  However, of 
the 35 MNCs in the sample, all but three had been involved in international acquisitions 
during the last five years, so we concluded that the measure would not help us to discriminate 
between those MNCs whose HQs moved overseas versus from those that did not.    
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 1 shows the Pearson zero-order correlations for both sets of data.  Table 2 presents the 
OLS regression and logistical regression results for the business unit-level data. Tables 3 and 
4 present the t-tests and OLS regression results for the corporate-level data.   
 
Consider the business unit-level analysis first.  Model one in Table 2 is an OLS regression 
model where the percentage of business unit HQ functions overseas is the dependent variable. 
The overall model explains 28% of the variance and is highly significant (F=5.31, p <.001).  
Model 2 in Table 2 is a Logistic regression model where the dependent variable is the 
location of business unit HQ (0=Sweden, 1=overseas).  Again, the overall model is highly 
significant. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Insert tables 1 and 2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
Proposition 1, that the percentage of the business unit’s activities overseas is associated with 
business unit HQ moving overseas, is strongly supported (p<.01 in both models).  Proposition 
2, that the perceived attractiveness of the new location is associated with business unit HQ 
moving overseas, is also strongly supported (p<.01 in both models).  Proposition 5, which 
argues that the level of employee flows between business unit and corporate HQ will have a 
negative relationship with business unit HQ moving overseas, is also supported though less 
strongly (p <.05)7.  However, none of the control variables is significant.  
 
The corporate-level analysis was undertaken in two ways.  As an exploratory step, we 
performed t-tests comparing the mean scores for the six companies with corporate HQ 
management teams overseas, and the 29 whose corporate HQs management teams are still in 
Sweden (Table 3).  Unfortunately, with such small numbers, there is little useful insight to be 
gained: only two variables - the percentage of international shareholders, and a primary stock 
exchange listing outside Stockholm - are significantly higher in the group of firms with 
overseas. 
 
------------------------------------- 
Insert tables 3 and 4 about here 
------------------------------------- 
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More insight was gained from the second analysis (table 4) in which the dependent variable 
was the percent of Corporate HQ functions overseas.  Proposition 3, that the influence of 
foreign shareholders is associated with corporate HQ moving overseas, was strongly 
supported.  Both the percent of international (i.e. non-Swedish) shareholders, and a primary 
stock exchange listing outside Stockholm, are significant (p<.01, p<.05 respectively).  
Proposition 4, that the influence of international customers and competitors is associated with 
corporate HQ moving overseas, was not supported.  There is indicative support for this 
proposition in the correlation matrix, but in the multivariate model the influence of foreign 
shareholders ends up dominating the influence of international customers and competitors.  
Finally, Proposition 5, that the level of corporate diversification (entropy measure) is 
associated with corporate HQ moving overseas, receives modest support (p<.10, two-tailed 
test). While this level of support is far from convincing, the small sample size makes it 
worthy of further consideration. 
 
It should also be observed that none of the control variables in this analysis were significant. 
In other words, the key predictor variables at the business unit level (percent activities 
overseas, perceived attractiveness of new location) were not significant at the corporate level. 
This is in line with our theoretical argument, but it is worth emphasising because it reinforces 
the insight that business unit and corporate HQ location decisions are driven by very different 
factors. 
 
Finally, we also explored a third operationalisation of corporate HQ location, namely the 
percentage of HQ employees working outside Sweden.  This is highly correlated (r=.93, 
p<.01) with the percentage of HQ functions outside Sweden. It yielded broadly the same 
results, though Proposition 3 received less support (p<.05) while Proposition 5 received more 
support (p<.05).  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Taken together, the results allow us to draw a number of provisional conclusions as to why 
some MNCs move their HQ operations overseas. First, business unit HQs relocate overseas 
when they already have a large percentage of their sales and manufacturing activities 
overseas, and they move to locations that are more attractive (in terms of industrial 
agglomeration and a favourable economic environment) than the host country.  This is very 
much what one would expect using the traditional theoretical arguments from the 
international business literature.  Second, corporate HQs move not because activities are 
overseas, and not to locations that are consistently more attractive than the host country, but 
instead as a response to the perceived demands from external stakeholders (notably, overseas 
shareholders and capital markets). This finding underlines the importance of the externally-
facing role of the corporate HQ, as the interface between the activities of the MNC’s business 
units and the capital markets.  The third key finding, though the evidence here is slightly 
weaker, is that the extent to which corporate or business unit HQs move overseas is a 
function of the interdependence between the two levels.  HQ relocation, in other words, is 
driven by the factors noted above, and it is hindered by the interdependence between 
corporate and business unit headquarters.  All of these findings are in line with the theoretical 
arguments developed in the paper. 
 
In terms of the broader implications of the research, the most important point is that the 
drivers of HQ relocation are very different in the business unit and corporate settings. It is 
already widely known that the activities of corporate HQ and business unit HQ are distinct, 
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but this is the first study to shed light on how the choice of location (the “where” of strategy) 
varies between the two levels.  And more importantly, it clearly exemplifies the extent to 
which some corporate HQs are actively disentangling themselves from the day-to-day 
monitoring of business units, and selecting a location based on their externally-focused 
activities.  
 
There are two interesting theoretical points that emerge from this research.  The first is the 
distinction between the internally- and externally-facing roles of the corporate HQ. While this 
is not an entirely novel observation, the literature has consistently underplayed this dimension 
and instead focused on Chandler’s (1991) distinction between the administrative and 
entrepreneurial functions (see also Foss, 1997).  Our research suggests the possibility of 
developing a richer conceptualization of the role of corporate HQ that builds on a 
combination of our work and Chandler’s (1991). Second, in terms of the theory of the MNC, 
there are also some interesting angles to pursue.  Rugman and Verbeke (1992; 2001) have 
developed a line of theory that explores the sources of firm-specific and country-specific 
advantages without the limiting assumption that everything emanates from the home country.  
Their work correctly shows how some firm-specific advantages emerge from the home 
country, some emerge from the foreign subsidiary, while others develop across the MNC’s 
network. What the current study emphasizes is the almost irrelevant distinction between 
home- and host-country in some instances.  Thus, when an MNC moves its corporate HQ, its 
“home” moves as well, but it will be many years before the HQ develops the level of 
institutional and social ties to its new location that one normally associates with a corporate 
HQ.  In terms of the Rugman and Verbeke (2001) framework, then, as well as the broader 
theoretical literature on the MNC, it may be interesting to reconsider what the concept of a 
“home” country really means.  
 
Finally, there are some potentially important implications for the worlds of management 
practice and public policy.  The trend is clearly towards greater levels of HQ relocation, and 
such changes raise a number of questions. For MNCs, the challenge is to make sense of the 
full costs and benefits of HQ relocation (rather than focusing narrowly on efficiency gains), 
and here our research provides a way of thinking through the drivers and helps to frame the 
choice in a more structured way. For public policymakers, and inward investment agencies in 
particular, the issues raised here are extremely important because in countries such as Sweden 
corporate and business unit HQs represent a major source of high value-added jobs.  
Moreover, if sufficient HQs move overseas there is a serious risk that other professional 
service providers, such as bankers, accountants and lawyers, will follow them.   Home 
country policymakers need to better understand the reasons why some HQs are moving 
overseas, and identify the difference between factors over which they have some control (e.g. 
tax rates, economic stability) and factors that are truly exogenous (e.g. Sweden’s 
geographical location on the periphery of Europe).  And this research provides a first step to 
helping them with this task. 
 
A number of limitations should be acknowledged in this research. First, the sample size was 
relatively small, and for that reason we are careful to acknowledge that the results are 
somewhat provisional. The reasons for this were discussed earlier, but it is an issue that needs 
to be addressed in future research by extending this study to a wider number of countries.  
Such a study could focus on countries with a similar profile to Sweden, such as Finland, 
Denmark, Netherlands and Canada, or it could look at large emerging economies such as 
South Africa, Mexico, China, Brazil and India, where there are already some cases of MNCs 
moving their HQs to locations such as London. Second, the study was based on some 
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simplifying assumptions about the size, nature and geographical scope of the HQ, and these 
could usefully be relaxed. For example, it would be interesting to examine the extent to 
which HQ operations are split between multiple countries, rather than concentrated in one 
country, and one could also look at the differences between full-scope HQ operations (with 
all functions represented) and “lean” HQs that limit themselves to a top management team.  
Some MNCs even claim that they do not have a corporate HQ per se, opting instead for a 
virtual HQ and the rotation of top management team meetings around a number of major 
cities. While there are good reasons to be sceptical about such models, this is certainly an 
area where practice is continually changing, and therefore where additional research is 
needed.  
 
This paper began with a simple question: why do some MNCs relocate their headquarters 
overseas? The answer is that business unit HQs typically move for the well-understood 
reasons of following their existing activities, while corporate HQs move to get closer to 
important external influencers, primarily shareholders and capital markets.  These different 
drivers shed light on the role of the corporate HQ in the MNC, and underline the very 
different functions of the HQ operation with regard to business-level and corporate-level 
strategy.   
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FIGURE 1. 
Conceptual Framework  
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TABLE 1 
Corporate HQ data: Pearson zero-order correlation coefficients (n=35) 
 
Variable Mea
n 
SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Legal domicile overseas .17 .38          
2. Percent corporate HQ functions overseas .10 .21 .90**         
3. Percent corporate HQ employees overseas .15 .27 .93** .93**        
4. Percent foreign shareholders 28.6 22.2 .38* .50** .35*       
5.  Primary exchange overseas .18 .39 .46** .50** .49** .29      
6. Percent customers/competitors outside Sweden 34.2 15.5 .25 .35* .28 .22 .16     
7. Entropy measure of Diversification .62 .45 .05 -.02 .09 -.09 -.14 -.02    
8. Percent sales and mfg units overseas 50.2 31.4 .28 .25 .36* -.04 .01 .53** .05   
9. Perceived attractiveness Swedish environment (rv) 4.14 .77 -.03 -.19 -.04 -.13 -.23 -.47* .11 -.03  
10.  Sales volume MSEK 35,652 34,693 .06 .09 -.01 .24 -.04 .32 .12 .09 -.13 
 
Business unit HQ data: Pearson zero-order correlation coefficients (n=125) 
 
Variable Mea
n 
SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Business unit top management overseas (0=no, 1=yes) .32 .47           
2. Percent business unit HQ functions overseas .36 .44 .81**          
3. Percent sales and mfg units of business unit overseas .74 .32 .45** .49**         
4. Perceived attractiveness of local environment 4.3 .72 .21* .14 -.08        
5. Flow of employees between business HQ & corporate HQ .79 4.2 .09 .09 -.08 .08       
6. Corporate percent foreign shareholders .31 .20 -.04 .04 .02 -.01 -.12      
7. Corporate percent customers/ competitors outside Sweden .84 .16 .20* .18 .31** -.15 -.09 .32**     
8. Corporate percent sales and mfg units overseas .56 .31 .26* .25** .31** -.09 -.13 .31** .72**    
9. Corporate entropy measure of Diversification .70 .42 -.08 .06 .02 -.05 .14 .18 .05 .06   
10. Corporate sales volume 38400 31400 -.01 -.04 .03 .14 -.01 -.05 .07 -.08 .04  
11. Business unit sales volume as percent of corporate 14.1 12.6 -.00 .10 .13 -.11 .02 .34** .26** -.01 .30** .09 
 
                   *  p <.05 
                   **     p < .01
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TABLE 2   
Business unit HQ data: Predictors of business unit HQ moving overseas 
 
 MODEL 1 
OLS Regression 
MODEL 2 
Logit 
 Percent business 
unit HQ 
functions 
overseas 
Business unit 
top management 
overseas 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
Percent sales and mfg units of business overseas .404*** 11.37 (3.38)** 
Perceived attractiveness of local environment .250** 1.38 (.51)** 
Flow of employees between business & corp HQ  -.180* -.151 (.69)* 
Corporate % foreign shareholders -.05 2.21 (1.90) 
Corporate % customers/competitors outside Swed. -.02 2.99 (3.24) 
Corporate percent sales and mfg units overseas .15 1.84 (1.69) 
Corporate entropy measure of Diversification .06 -1.16 (.77) 
Corporate sales volume .12 .00 (.00) 
Business unit sales volume as percent of corporate .03 .00 (.029) 
R Square / Adjusted R square .342 / .278  
F test 5.31***  
-2 log likelihood  65.7 
R squared (cox & snell, Nagelkerke)  .442 / .625 
Percent classified correctly  83.3% 
 Values are standardized Beta coefficients 
 † p < .10    
 * p <.05    
 ** p < .01    
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TABLE 3 
Corporate HQ data: t-tests for differences between Swedish and overseas legal HQ 
 
Mean: Legal 
domicile 
Sweden 
(n=29) 
Legal 
domicile 
overseas 
(n=6) 
T-test (sig) 
Percent foreign shareholders 24.7 46.3 -2.29* 
Primary exchange overseas .11 .60 -2.87** 
Percent customers/competitors 
outside Sweden 
32.4% 42.7% -1.54 
Entropy measure diversification .61 .66 -.27 
Percent sales & mfg units overseas 46.3 69.1 -.165 
Perceived attractiveness Swedish 
environment1 
4.15 4.09 .163 
Sales volume MSEK 34,773 39,901 -.33 
 * p <.05 
 ** p <.01 
 1For Quality Swedish location a larger number means a more attractive Swedish 
 location, which is the opposite directionality to all other variables. 
 
 
TABLE 4  
Corporate HQ data: Predictors of corporate HQ moving overseas 
 
 MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
 % Corporate 
HQ functions 
overseas 
% corporate HQ 
employees 
overseas 
Percent foreign shareholders .595** .456* 
Primary exchange overseas .345* .418* 
Percent customers/competitors outside Sweden .125 -.093 
Entropy measure diversification .250† .316* 
Percent sales & mfg units overseas .107 .170 
Perceived attractiveness Swedish environment1 -.029 .132 
Sales volume MSEK -.162 -.234 
R Square / Adjusted R square .603 / .459 .575 / .420 
F 4.19** 3.72** 
    Values are standardized Beta coefficients 
          † p < .10    
 * p <.05    
 ** p < .01    
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ENDNOTES 
 
1 We analysed the Fortune 500 lists for the entire period of the 1990s, and tracked cases of corporate 
HQs that had moved overseas.  The breakdown of HQ relocations by original home country was: 
Sweden – 5, Netherlands – 3, UK – 4, Finland – 2, Canada – 3, South Africa – 4, Australia – 2. 
2 We could also have included other external actors in this analysis, including the labour market for 
executives and NGOs, but as we do not examine these factors in our empirical research, they are not 
given further attention here.   
3 We focused on only the top 40 because the next group of firms showed little or no variation in the 
dependent variable corporate HQ activities overseas. 
4 We also measured the number of HQ employees overseas for the corporate HQ. This was correlated 
0.93 with percent of functions overseas. 
5 To ensure some consistency in these measures, we used Hoovers directory which for each corporation 
lists all major competitors, typically 10-30.  We then identified the national home market of each of 
these competitors, and calculated the percentage of these that lay outside Sweden, and outside Europe. 
While Hoovers' list may not be comprehensive, it benefits from being relatively independent, and thus 
not likely to be biased either towards or against one particularly nationality of competitors. 
6 There is a subtle difference as well: for the corporate data, we asked all respondents to evaluate 
Sweden, rather than the location in which the HQ was located. This was possible because all six 
overseas HQs were staffed by Swedes with a strong (and recent) knowledge of the Swedish business 
environment.  However, this also meant that the variable needed to be reverse-coded for analysis, 
because we would anticipate those executives who had moved their HQ overseas would rate Sweden 
more negatively than those still based in Sweden. 
7 It should be acknowledged that there is some danger of reciprocal causality in this relationship.  Thus, 
high levels of employee flow will limit the likelihood of the business unit HQ moving overseas, but the 
reverse is also true:  those business units that stay close to their corporate HQ will be more likely to 
engage in employee flows.  However, when this finding is combined with the corporate-level result 
(using the entropy measure) we are confident that the primary causal flow is as predicted. 
